OPEN PROBLEMS IN VETO THEORY

DOI10.1142/S0219198913400069zbMath1274.91165OpenAlexW2147155354MaRDI QIDQ2854005

Vito Fragnelli, Michela Chessa

Publication date: 17 October 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400069

zbMATH Keywords

blockingindicesveto

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (1)

The bargaining set for sharing the power

Cites Work

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• Multicameral voting cohesion games
• A decisiveness index for simple games
• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• Protectionism and blocking power indices
• A new index of power for simple n-person games
• Ternary voting games
• A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
• A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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