SOME NONSTANDARD FEATURES OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS

DOI10.1142/S0219198913400070zbMath1274.91205OpenAlexW2007872837MaRDI QIDQ2854006

Vito Fragnelli, Alessandro Agnetis

Publication date: 17 October 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400070

zbMATH Keywords

convexitybargaining problemdiscrete set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem
• Computing the Nash solution for scheduling bargaining problems
• An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function
• Nash bargaining theory, nonconvex problems and social welfare orderings
• A Lagrangian approach to single-machine scheduling problems with two competing agents
• Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite
• The Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems

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