MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY

DOI10.1142/S0219198913400082zbMath1274.91329OpenAlexW2026670976MaRDI QIDQ2854007

Flip Klijn, Péter Biró

Publication date: 17 October 2013

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400082

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycomputational complexitymatchingincentive compatibilitycouplesrestricted domainslarge markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (14)

Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools ⋮ Matching couples with Scarf's algorithm ⋮ Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems ⋮ Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries ⋮ Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples ⋮ ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings ⋮ Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing ⋮ On the complexity of stable fractional hypergraph matching

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