On the secession-stability of Nash equilibria in a model of endogenous coalition formation
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Publication:2854265
zbMATH Open1273.91027MaRDI QIDQ2854265
Publication date: 18 October 2013
Published in: Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i eΓ« Prilozheniya (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://mathnet.ru/eng/mgta72
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