The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings
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Publication:2857040
DOI10.3982/ECTA10011zbMath1274.91330OpenAlexW3124358017MaRDI QIDQ2857040
Federico Echenique, Matthew Shum, M. Bumin Yenmez, SangMok Lee
Publication date: 31 October 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10011
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