Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections

DOI10.3982/ECTA8311zbMath1274.91163OpenAlexW3124233884MaRDI QIDQ2857588

Sourav Bhattacharya

Publication date: 4 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8311

zbMATH Keywords

electionsvotinginformation aggregationpreference monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

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Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Consistency and communication in committees ⋮ Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives ⋮ Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers ⋮ The fragility of information aggregation in large elections ⋮ Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility ⋮ Herding with collective preferences ⋮ Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences ⋮ When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives ⋮ Voting on tricky questions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

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