Learning and Information Aggregation in an Exit Game

DOI10.1093/restud/rdr007zbMath1274.91109OpenAlexW1985392021MaRDI QIDQ2857662

Pauli Murto, Juuso Välimäki

Publication date: 5 November 2013

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://aaltodoc.aalto.fi/handle/123456789/35376

zbMATH Keywords

learningoptimal stoppingdynamic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Games of timing (91A55)

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