One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
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Publication:2859051
DOI10.3982/ECTA9111zbMath1274.91164OpenAlexW1547780190MaRDI QIDQ2859051
Laurent Bouton, Micael Castanheira
Publication date: 6 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9111
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