Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
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Publication:2859057
DOI10.3982/ECTA7143zbMath1274.91332OpenAlexW3124176509MaRDI QIDQ2859057
Publication date: 6 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7143
stabilityconsistencycorecomplementaritiesNash bargainingcoalition formationpeer effectsmany-to-one matchingsharing rulesassortative matching
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
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