Higher Order Uncertainty and Information: Static and Dynamic Games

DOI10.3982/ECTA9159zbMath1274.91017OpenAlexW2141756751MaRDI QIDQ2859066

Antonio Penta

Publication date: 6 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9159

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessuniquenessinformationhigher-order beliefshierarchies of beliefsinterim sequential rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (9)

Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs ⋮ Robust dynamic implementation ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty

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