Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games

DOI10.3982/ECTA9579zbMath1274.91011OpenAlexW3021725035MaRDI QIDQ2859511

Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Publication date: 8 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9579

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityinvarianceembeddingrefinementbackward inductionadmissibilityaxiomsmall worlds

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Invariance to representation of information ⋮ A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria ⋮ Forward induction equilibrium ⋮ On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria ⋮ Where Strategic and Evolutionary Stability Depart—A Study of Minimal Diversity Games ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension

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