Reputational Bargaining With Minimal Knowledge of Rationality
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Publication:2859526
DOI10.3982/ECTA9865zbMath1274.91241OpenAlexW1485050818MaRDI QIDQ2859526
Publication date: 8 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9865
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (10)
Hierarchical experimentation ⋮ Sanctions in networks: ``The most unkindest cut of all ⋮ Driving a hard bargain is a balancing act: how social preferences constrain the negotiation process ⋮ Optimal policy with credibility concerns ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining ⋮ A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
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