Mechanism Design With Renegotiation and Costly Messages

DOI10.3982/ECTA8772zbMath1274.91222OpenAlexW1602672052MaRDI QIDQ2859527

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Publication date: 8 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8772

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractscommunication costshold-up problemimplementation with renegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14)

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