A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
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Publication:2859537
DOI10.3982/ECTA9859zbMath1274.91229OpenAlexW1901468019WikidataQ56658235 ScholiaQ56658235MaRDI QIDQ2859537
Publication date: 8 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9859
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