Valuing Dealers' Informational Advantage: A Study of Canadian Treasury Auctions

DOI10.3982/ECTA8365zbMath1274.91227OpenAlexW1604405909MaRDI QIDQ2859543

Ali Hortaçsu, Jakub Kastl

Publication date: 8 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8365

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionsnonparametric identification and estimationstructural estimationtreasury auctionstest for common values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Nonparametric hypothesis testing (62G10) Nonparametric estimation (62G05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

ESTIMATION OF (STATIC OR DYNAMIC) GAMES UNDER EQUILIBRIUM MULTIPLICITY ⋮ Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions ⋮ Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test ⋮ How does market network structure affect participants' benefits? ⋮ Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects ⋮ Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule

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