Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets With Strategic Traders

DOI10.3982/ECTA8479zbMath1274.91289OpenAlexW1522094730MaRDI QIDQ2859550

Michael Ostrovsky

Publication date: 8 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8479

zbMATH Keywords

arbitragerational expectations equilibriumefficient market hypothesisinformation aggregationprediction markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44)

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