Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

DOI10.3982/ECTA8910zbMath1274.91325OpenAlexW3125764608WikidataQ57407351 ScholiaQ57407351MaRDI QIDQ2859555

Fabrizio Zilibotti, Zheng Song, Kjetil Storesletten

Publication date: 8 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8910

zbMATH Keywords

general equilibriumpublic goodssmall open economiespolitical economyfiscal policyMarkov equilibriumgovernment debtrepeated votingintergenerational conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) History, political science (91F10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (12)

Taxing capital is a good idea: the role of idiosyncratic risk in an OLG model ⋮ REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY ⋮ The political intergenerational welfare state ⋮ Hysteresis and fiscal policy ⋮ Limited asset market participation and fiscal sustainability ⋮ Strategic interactions in U.S. monetary and fiscal policies ⋮ A theory of political and economic cycles ⋮ Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: a positive theory ⋮ Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991) ⋮ The impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk ⋮ Vote-motivated candidates ⋮ Beliefs about public debt and the demand for government spending

This page was built for publication: Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt