Multiple agents finitely repeated inspection game with dismissals

DOI10.1007/s10479-014-1703-6zbMath1339.91018OpenAlexW1977469983MaRDI QIDQ285986

Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany

Publication date: 19 May 2016

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1703-6

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumresource allocationrepeated gamesinspection games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites Work

• Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game
• A Stackelberg game model for resource allocation in cargo container security
• Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks
• Nature plays with dice - terrorists do not: Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks
• Imperfect inspection games over time
• Dismissals and quits in repeated games
• Allocating multiple defensive resources in a zero-sum game setting
• Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds