The strategic interaction between a company and the government surrounding disasters

DOI10.1007/S10479-014-1684-5zbMath1339.91071OpenAlexW1970703436MaRDI QIDQ285988

Kjell Hausken, Jun Zhuang

Publication date: 19 May 2016

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1684-5

zbMATH Keywords

productionprofitconflicttaxationcontestdisastersafety effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (3)

Natural disasters and their impact on cooperation against a common enemy ⋮ Two-stage security screening strategies in the face of strategic applicants, congestions and screening errors ⋮ Role of Intelligence Inputs in Defending Against Cyber Warfare and Cyberterrorism

Cites Work

• Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems
• Interdependent security
• Contest success functions
• The impact of disaster on the strategic interaction between company and government
• Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters—Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort
• Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function
• Regulation Games Between Government and Competing Companies: Oil Spills and Other Disasters
• Guest editorial

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