Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information
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Publication:2864814
DOI10.3982/ECTA11105zbMath1371.91007MaRDI QIDQ2864814
No author found.
Publication date: 26 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
identificationincomplete informationcorrelated equilibriummoment restrictionsBayes correlated equilibriuminformation boundslinear best responsesquadratic payoffsrobustness to private information
Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)
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