The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
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Publication:2864826
DOI10.3982/ECTA9288zbMath1287.91106OpenAlexW2110033135MaRDI QIDQ2864826
Publication date: 26 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9288
monopolistic competitionperfect competitionmoney burningoptimal delegationinterval delegationtariff captrade agreement
Decision theory (91B06) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Trade models (91B60) Economics of information (91B44) Social choice (91B14) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69) Welfare economics (91B15)
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