Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options

DOI10.3982/ECTA9200zbMath1276.91059OpenAlexW2098751494MaRDI QIDQ2864827

Jihong Lee, Qing-Min Liu

Publication date: 26 November 2013

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9200

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingincomplete informationrepeated gameoutside optionreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (9)

Dynamic persuasion ⋮ The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining ⋮ Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Noisy signaling in discrete time ⋮ Transparency of outside options in bargaining ⋮ A theory of bargaining deadlock ⋮ Fiscal federalism in a monetary union: the no-cooperation pitfall ⋮ Personal power dynamics in bargaining

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