Parameterized Complexity of Control and Bribery for d-Approval Elections
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Publication:2867125
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-03780-6_23zbMath1408.91068OpenAlexW2397607982MaRDI QIDQ2867125
Jianxin Wang, Min Yang, Qilong Feng, Jiong Guo, Jian'er Chen
Publication date: 10 December 2013
Published in: Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03780-6_23
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