Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
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Publication:2867442
DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1664zbMath1277.91068OpenAlexW2150771176MaRDI QIDQ2867442
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70369
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
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