Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information
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Publication:2867444
DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1637zbMath1277.91017OpenAlexW3122762869MaRDI QIDQ2867444
Antonio Penta, Alfredo Di Tillio, Edoardo Grillo, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:340
Game theory (91A99) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (14)
Admissibility and assumption ⋮ Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play ⋮ Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria ⋮ Invariance to representation of information ⋮ Cautious belief and iterated admissibility ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality ⋮ Dynamic psychological games ⋮ Informational robustness of common belief in rationality ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
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