Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1686zbMath1277.91014OpenAlexW3125088822MaRDI QIDQ2867462

Jack Robles

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1686

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityevolutionrepeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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