Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1772zbMath1277.91138OpenAlexW2017079409MaRDI QIDQ2867466

Serkan Kucuksenel

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1772

zbMATH Keywords

coreimplementationcollege admissions problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Cites Work

• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
• Non-cooperative implementation of the core
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core

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