Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1919zbMath1277.91109OpenAlexW1972307692MaRDI QIDQ2867468

Levent Koçkesen, Emanuele Gerratana

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://cdm21054.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/IR/id/1145

zbMATH Keywords

strategic delegationrenegotiationthird-party contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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