On Rationalizability and Beliefs in Discrete Private-Value First-Price Auctions

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1829zbMath1277.91070OpenAlexW1974703347MaRDI QIDQ2867479

Jack Robles, Makoto Shimoji

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1829

zbMATH Keywords

beliefsdominancerationalizabilityfirst-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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