Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1833zbMath1277.91066OpenAlexW3122093973MaRDI QIDQ2867480

Shmuel Leshem, Avraham D. Tabbach

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1833

zbMATH Keywords

strategic complementsStackelbergstrategic substitutesenforcementinspection game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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