Endogenous Preferences and Dynamic Contract Design

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1834zbMath1277.91113OpenAlexW3123681358MaRDI QIDQ2867482

Wei Zhang

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1834

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentself-controlendogenous preferencesdynamic contract designendogenous softening effectendogenous toughening effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (1)

On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment

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