Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1789zbMath1277.91104OpenAlexW2170878546MaRDI QIDQ2867499

Duygu Yengin

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1789

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrystrategy-proofnessno-envyfair allocationGroves mechanismsunanimitysolidaritydistributive justiceorder preservationegalitarian-equivalenceallocation of indivisible (public) goods and moneyimposition of tasksNIMBY problemswelfare egalitarianism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Explicitly simple near-tie auctions ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem

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