Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions

DOI10.1515/1935-1704.1880zbMath1277.91061OpenAlexW2023098247MaRDI QIDQ2867501

Dan Levin, Yaron Azrieli

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1704.1880

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitydominance solvabilitylarge auctions\(k\)-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

A note on \(k\)-price auctions with complete information when mixed strategies are allowed

This page was built for publication: Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions