Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games

DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0012zbMath1277.91004OpenAlexW2233538328MaRDI QIDQ2867510

A. W. Beggs

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3ddbe26d-7723-4dff-ade3-7e0961e6bf78

zbMATH Keywords

uniquenesscopulasrisk dominanceglobal gamesBayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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• An introduction to copulas.
• A contraction principle for finite global games
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• Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Handbook of Financial Time Series
• Uniform stochastic ordering and related inequalities
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymptotic Statistics
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

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