Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2867516
DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0014zbMath1278.91071OpenAlexW1996394718MaRDI QIDQ2867516
Nicola Doni, Domenico Menicucci
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/18355/ECO_2011_27.pdf?sequence=1
Related Items (5)
Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch ⋮ Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions ⋮ Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
Cites Work
- Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
- A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
- Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- Comparative statics in first price auctions
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions: filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
- Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
- Optimal Auction Design
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
This page was built for publication: Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations
