Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information
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Publication:2867522
DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0005zbMath1278.91021OpenAlexW2007142017MaRDI QIDQ2867522
Andrea Prestipino, Pierpaolo Battigalli
Publication date: 19 December 2013
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:376
Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (7)
On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
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