Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly

DOI10.1515/bejte-2012-0015zbMath1278.91076OpenAlexW2113074874MaRDI QIDQ2867527

Luke Hu

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13177/

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designindustrial organizationprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Participation in auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
• Second-price auctions with private entry costs

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