Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Score

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14zbMath1406.91107OpenAlexW117600906MaRDI QIDQ2868553

Toby Walsh, Kristen Brent Venable, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi, Umberto Grandi

Publication date: 17 December 2013

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_14

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet efficiencyiterative votingBorda score

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting ⋮ Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting

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