Private Information and Insurance Rejections

DOI10.3982/ECTA10931zbMath1282.91152OpenAlexW3126043879WikidataQ37267907 ScholiaQ37267907MaRDI QIDQ2869953

Nathaniel Hendren

Publication date: 7 January 2014

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10931

zbMATH Keywords

insuranceadverse selectionprivate information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (7)

THE 2013 LAWRENCE R. KLEIN LECTURE: BEHAVIORAL AND DESCRIPTIVE FORMS OF CHOICE MODELS† ⋮ REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling ⋮ Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection ⋮ The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making ⋮ Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost ⋮ Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection

This page was built for publication: Private Information and Insurance Rejections