Calibrated Incentive Contracts

DOI10.3982/ECTA9987zbMath1287.91104MaRDI QIDQ2871443

Sylvain Chassang

Publication date: 7 January 2014

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

approachabilitydynamic contractsrobust contractsdetail-free contractshigh-watermark contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (16)

Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions ⋮ Robust contracting with additive noise ⋮ Robust incentives for information acquisition ⋮ Persuasion with unknown beliefs ⋮ Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability ⋮ Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option ⋮ Reward schemes ⋮ Locally robust contracts for moral hazard ⋮ Robust incentives for risk ⋮ Robust contracting under double moral hazard ⋮ Robust Incentives for Teams ⋮ Weighted utility optimization of the participating endowment contract ⋮ Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard ⋮ Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion ⋮ Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism ⋮ Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?

This page was built for publication: Calibrated Incentive Contracts