Proportional Representation
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2871623
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-03856-8zbMath1281.91004OpenAlexW4253419473MaRDI QIDQ2871623
Publication date: 8 January 2014
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03856-8
Applications of statistics to social sciences (62P25) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01)
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