FUZZY BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FUZZY RULES AND STRICT PREFERENCE

DOI10.1142/S179300571240011XzbMath1281.91067OpenAlexW2027835012MaRDI QIDQ2873490

Michael B. Gibilisco, Terry D. Clark, John N. Mordeson

Publication date: 24 January 2014

Published in: New Mathematics and Natural Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s179300571240011x

zbMATH Keywords

fuzzy preferencesfuzzy aggregation rulesfuzzy maximal setBlack's median voter theoremfuzzy simple rulesfuzzy voting rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of fuzzy sets, etc. (03E72) Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Arrow's theorem and max-star transitivity
• On the manipulability of the fuzzy social choice functions
• On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
• Structural instability of the core
• Fuzzy preferences and social choice
• On the core of voting games
• A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Orlovsky's choice set
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences
• The structure of fuzzy preferences: social choice implications
• Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules
• Fuzzy strict preference and social choice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• ON PROGRAMMING WITH FUZZY CONSTRAINT SETS
• FUZZY VOTERS, CRISP VOTES
• SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?

This page was built for publication: FUZZY BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FUZZY RULES AND STRICT PREFERENCE