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Publication:2873814

zbMath1293.93004MaRDI QIDQ2873814

D. A. Novikov, A. G. Chkhartishvili

Publication date: 27 January 2014

Full work available at URL: http://www.crcnetbase.com/isbn/9781315775548

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