Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
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Publication:2875156
DOI10.1145/1806689.1806732zbMath1293.91085arXiv0909.4756OpenAlexW2054039722MaRDI QIDQ2875156
Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier
Publication date: 13 August 2014
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0909.4756
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
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