Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing

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Publication:2875157

DOI10.1145/1806689.1806733zbMath1293.91078OpenAlexW2077124610MaRDI QIDQ2875157

Shuchi Chawla, Balasubramanian Sivan, David Malec, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date: 13 August 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1806689.1806733




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