Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items

DOI10.1145/1806689.1806743zbMath1293.91077arXiv0907.4166OpenAlexW2135012080MaRDI QIDQ2875165

Sayan Bhattacharya, Kamesh Munagala, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Gagan Goel

Publication date: 13 August 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.4166

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

Related Items (13)

Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items ⋮ Applications of $$\alpha $$-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions ⋮ A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ Optimal pricing for MHR distributions ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment ⋮ When LP is the cure for your matching woes: improved bounds for stochastic matchings ⋮ Polyhedral Clinching Auctions and the AdWords Polytope ⋮ Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing ⋮ Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders ⋮ Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors ⋮ Worst-Case Mechanism Design via Bayesian Analysis

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