ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002915zbMath1237.91146OpenAlexW2055690373MaRDI QIDQ2883135

Pierre Dehez

Publication date: 11 May 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002915

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecost allocationfixed cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods ⋮ A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value

Cites Work

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• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
• WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Multilinear Extensions of Games

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