STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION
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Publication:2883138
DOI10.1142/S0219198911002927zbMath1236.91107OpenAlexW1985165141MaRDI QIDQ2883138
Mabel Marí, Alejandro Neme, Delfina Femenia, Jorge A. Oviedo
Publication date: 11 May 2012
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002927
Cites Work
- Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
- Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems.
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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