COMPETITION AND THE STRATEGIC CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES: THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CASE

DOI10.1111/j.1467-999X.2011.04124.xzbMath1239.90057MaRDI QIDQ2890959

Caterina Colombo, Marcella Scrimitore, Alessandra Chirco

Publication date: 12 June 2012

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs ⋮ Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand ⋮ Dynamic Cournot oligopoly game based on general isoelastic demand

Cites Work

• Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior

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