INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS UNDER INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

DOI10.1111/J.1467-999X.2011.04132.XzbMath1239.91024OpenAlexW1550178437MaRDI QIDQ2890967

Kelly de Bruin, Miyuki Nagashima, Hans-Peter Weikard, Rob Dellink

Publication date: 12 June 2012

Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999x.2011.04132.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (1)

International carbon trade with constrained allowance choices: results from the STACO model

Cites Work

• Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
• Discounting climate change
• Can international environmental cooperation be bought?
• Why the far-distant future should be discounted at its lowest possible rate
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• Staggered price setting with endogenous frequency of adjustment
• Measuring intergenerational time preference: Are future lives valued Less?
• Optimal CO\(_2\) abatement in the presence of induced technological change
• Directed Technical Change

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